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Is The Exclusionary Rule in Failing

Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion
By BRADLEY C. CANON*
I

As a uniform and constitutionally mandated policy, the exclusionary rule in cases involving search and seizure is entering

a stormy adolescence following a serene childhood. This rule
prohibits the admission of evidence in any criminal case' which
is obtained by means of an illegal search, i.e., one forbidden by
the fourth amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable"

searches and seizures and the statutes and case law which apply
it. As a non-constitutional policy, the exclusionary rule's antecedents can be traced to Weeks v. United States,2 where it was

adopted for the federal courts in 1914. Almost half the states
subscribed to it during the period from 1920 to 1960 by either

legislative or appellate court action,3 but it was not until the
1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio4 that the exclusionary rule was elevated
to the status of a constitutionally derived policy. Rejecting argu-

ments that adoption should be a discretionary matter based upon
* Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science,
University of Kentucky.
The study resulting in this publication was made under a fellowship granted
by the Ford Foundation. However, the conclusions, opinions, and other statements
herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ford Foundation.
The author was assisted in the gathering of material by Tim Rose, a graduate
student in political science at the University of Wisconsin, Penny Erhardt, a law
student at Wisconsin, Don Harris and Charlie Johnson, both graduate students in
political science at the University of Kentucky. During the course of the research
helpful suggestions were offered by Professors Herman Goldstein and Frank
Remington of the Wisconsin Law School and by George Kellng, a graduate student
in sociology at Wisconsin. None of them, however, should necessarily be associated with the conclusions, opinions or other statements in this article.
1 It also prohibits civil forfeiture of material illegally seized. See One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 880 U.S. 693 (1965).
232 U.S. 883 (1914).
3
For a list of the states adopting the rule and the vehicle of adoption, see the
appendix to Elkins v. United States, 864 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960).
4367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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legislators' or judges' choice of values, the United States Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Tom Clark, held that because
exclusion of evidence was the only workable sanction for violation
of fourth amendment rights, failure to give the rule constitutional
status would be to "grant the right, but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment." 5
Prior to Mapp, the exclusionary rule had been the subject of
considerable public debate which focused primarily on the logic
of the rule. Opponents argued that it was not consistent with
the purpose of fact finding to reject valid and probative evidence
which was useful to the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. The application of the rule thwarted justice
instead of enhancing it. The classic statement of this position was
formulated by Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo in People
v. Defore6 and epitomized in the sentence: "[I]s the criminal to
go free because the constable has blundered?" Dean Wigmore
was also a harsh critic of what he perceived as the rule's illogic.s
Proponents of the exclusionary rule conceded that it would permit
some guilty parties to escape punishment, but argued that it was
the only effective means to enforce the prohibition against
"unreasonable searches." They suggest that if we value the fourth
amendment's guarantees, we are obligated to make them more
than a "mere rhapsody of words."" Moreover, as Justice Clark
wrote in Mapp, "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws or worse, its disregard of
the charter of its own existence."'10 Each side seemed to be
arguing from different premises, or at least according different
priorities to the values involved in the dispute, and thus no widespread integration of viewpoints or changes of mind occurred;
each won some victories in the half century preceding 1961.11
5 Id. at 656.
6 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926).

7 Id. at 587.
8 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
9 City of Tacoma v. Horton, 882 P.2d 245, 254 (Wash. 1963). (Donworth, J.,
dissenting).de Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
11 The proponents of the rule won adoption in about 20 states during the
1920's, often as a device to soften the enforcement of Prohibition. There were
fewer adoptions after World War HI. But one of them, People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d
905 (Cal. 1955), was considered a major success because it came in a respected
court in a populous state. Opponents of the exclusionary rule won their biggest
state successes when the 1938 New York State Constitutional Convention rejected
(Continued on next page)
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Because of the running debate over the logic of the exclusionary rule, the Mapp decision received a fair amount of criticism. 12 Much of it came from law enforcement officials,'13 but

academic objections were raised as well. 4 However, criticism

of the exclusionary rule never reached the quantitative or emotional crescendo that occurred following some Supreme Court

decisions later in the decade such as Escobedo'5 or Miranda.'
Indeed, Mapp evoked considerable support, including occasional
praise from otherwise vehement critics of the high court." In
short, by the mid 1960's the exclusionary rule seemed to be in
good health and destined for a long if unexciting career.
In the last few years, however, the outlook has begun to change
rapidly. The rule's vitality has declined precipitously, and its

chances of reaching adulthood unimpaired can be diagnosed as
uncertain at best. Quite recently judges, lawyers, scholars, and
politicians have evidenced considerable dissatisfaction with the
rule, and consequently it is once again surrounded by controversy.
But the new assault is by no means a mere revival of the pre-Mapp
arguments. Now, to paraphrase Holmes, the life of the controversy is not logic but experience.' 8
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the rule and when Michigan voters twice amended their constitution in 1936 and
1952 to withdraw weapons and narcotics seized outside the home from the rule's
scope. Their most spectacular victory came in 1949 when the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the exclusionary rule was not constitutionally mandated
upon the states, Wolf v. Colorado, 838 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf, of course, was overred by Mapp
12In adton, Mapp was criticized on federalism grounds, i.e., regardless of
the rule's logic, the states should be left to accept it or reject it themselves. See
the discussion in Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for
Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (1961) and Friendly, The Bill of Rights As A Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965).
13 See, e.g., BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY, ANNUAL REPORT at 5 (196364); CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT at 5 (1962); CINCINNATI
POLICE DEPAnTmENT, ANNUAL REPORT at 7 (1961); NEW YORK Crr POLICE DEARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT

at 10 (1966); Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora'sProb-

lems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 4 (1962); Wilson, Police Authority in
a Free Society, 54 J. C um. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1963). Several quotations from law
enforcement officials are noted in Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-ProsecutorOriented Critics of the Court, 49 CORNEU. L.Q. 436 (1964).
14 See, e.g. Burns, Mapp v. Ohio, An All American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L.
REv. 80 (19695; Inbau, More About Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 J.
Crum. L.C. & P.S. 329 (1962); Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio
Without Amending the Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815 (1964).
15 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
36 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17 See, e.g., Mann v. City of Heber Springs, 395 S.W.2d 557 (Ark. 1965)
(Johnson, J., concurring); and Commonwealth v. Ametrane, 221 A.2d 296 (Pa.
1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
180 . Houvs, THEm COMMON LAw 5 (M. Howe ed. 1968).
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Opponents of the exclusionary rule no longer expound the
Cardozian argument or even imply that the value of controlling
crime and bringing violators to justice takes precedence over
individual rights. Instead, they concede, arguendo at least, the
premises of those who favored the rule in the pre-Mapp days
and then proceed to strike the rule's proponents on their own
high ground. The gist of their attack is quite simple: the rule
does not work. Experience shows, they say, that the rule has not
accomplished the desired goal: that of police observance of
fourth amendment rights. Rather, it is argued, law enforcement
officials continue unreasonable invasions of the sanctity of homes,
offices and automobiles, almost as if the exclusionary rule had
never been adopted. In other words, the exclusionary rule has
not fulfilled the promise of its own premise and thus the relative
value of the right to privacy should be recognized as bearing
little weight in evaluating the rule. Consequently, bringing
wrongdoers to justice, even if a secondary objective in an abstract
ordering of values, should now become the primary premise on
which to evaluate the rule. And, they argue, it is almost axiomatic
that the exclusionary rule hinders the accomplishment of this

goal.

19

Professor Dallin Oaks has advanced the most salient and
thorough attack on the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in a
lengthy analysis which appeared in 1970 in which he concentrated
on empirical data.20 First, he collated, described, and analyzed
previous empirical research pertaining to the effects of the
exclusionary rule. (Some of this research will be briefly described
below.) What little previous research there was tended to be
sketchy and generally insufficient, so that the findings were therefore rather inconclusive. Oaks, however, thought that insofar
as the results pointed in any direction, they supported an argument that the exclusionary rule was inefficacious in preventing
unconstitutional searches.
Oaks also reported on some of his own empirical research.
19 Professor Fred Inbau implies that the exclusionary rule encourages crime.
See Inbau, supra note 14, at 331. For a more explicit argument, see Parker, The

California Crime Rise, 47 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 721 (1957).
20 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 V. Cm. L.
Itsv. 665 (1970).
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Primarily this involved comparing arrest and conviction data for
three search-and-seizure-type crimes in Cincinnati for several
years preceding and following Mapp. He concluded that "the
Mapp decision does not seem to have any effect whatever upon
the number of arrests or upon the number or percent of convictions"' 21 insofar as weapons and narcotics crimes were concerned,
but conceded that Mapp might have had some impact on
gambling arrests and convictions, although he thought the figures
rather inconclusive here.22 Furthermore, Oaks collected data on
the confiscation of handguns, narcotics and gambling paraphenalia
in Cincinnati before and after Mapp and came to a similar conclusion.2 3 Finally, Oaks systematically discussed some additional avenues of empirical research which could produce decisive
results. In addition to obtaining more numerous and varied
before-and-after statistics similar to those he collected for Cincinnati, he suggested a comparison of Canadian search and seizure
experiences (where no exclusionary rule prevails) with those in
comparable American situations, as well as conversation and
observation with law enforcement personnel about past and
present norms relating to search and seizure behavior.
It is clear throughout his article that Oaks is no friend of the
exclusionary rule. Although he readily concedes (if, indeed, it is
not his primary point) that evidence of the rule's inefficacy is
currently insufficient, a strong expectation that additional research will reinforce his belief that the rule is not working
permeates his discussion. Indeed, in a postscript to the article,
he pronounces the exclusionary rule a failure and urges that it be
24
abolished.
Because of its scope and recency, Oaks' empirical challenge to
the exclusionary rule has attained wide visibility in both legal and
political circles. Undoubtedly it has served as one of the primary
catalysts in the current movement to reexamine the rule. Chief
21

Id. at 690.

22 Id. at 691.

23 Id. at 693-96. Oaks also compared the frequency with which motions to
sujppress were granted in trials for gambling, narcotics, stolen property and a few
other offenses in Chicago and Washington, D.C. at various times in the 1960's, but
did not closely relate these findings with conclusions about the exclusionary rule's
efficacy.
24,Id. at 755. However, Oaks would not abolish
the rule until a more effective

tort remedy can be substituted.
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Justice Burger cited it in his own attack on the rule,26 5 and other
critics have also featured Oaks' findings prominently.
However, other research has been done in the area. With one
exception, these researchers have not been overfly hostile to the
exclusionary rule, but generally their findings can serve as ammunition for the rule's opponents (although the distribution of
ammunition is not altogether one-sided). In order to get a better
picture of just how the exclusionary rule has been empirically
evaluated to date, we will briefly note four important pieces of
27
research below.
Perhaps the most systematic investigation was carried out in
a study by Columbia University Law School students. 2

In

it

they analyzed the evidentiary situation surrounding the arrest
and disposition of all misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York
City for the six-month periods preceding and following Mapp. 9
The students found that the number of post-Mapp narcotics
arrests were down about 50% for the Narcotics Bureau, although
substantially unchanged for the Uniformed and Detective Bureaus. There was also a dramatic shift in police reports (found in
all divisions but particularly pronounced in the Narcotics Bureau)
as to the location of seized narcotics. Whereas before Mapp arrest
reports had indicated that approximately 40% of the contraband
2

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416
(1971),
26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

E.g., AMERICAN LAw INsTrr.E, MODEL CODE OF PE-ARmRANMMNT PROcEDaE § 290.2, Comment (Official Draft No. 1, July 15, 1972); Spiotto, Search

and Seizure: An EmpiricalStudy of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2
J. OF LEGAL STruEs 243 (1973); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Search &
Seizure: Examination and Prognosis,20 KAN. L. REv. 110 (1972).
27 Results of three of the four have appeared subsequent to Oaks' article
(although one relies in part on Oaks' data). Four less important empirical studies
reported in Oaks' collation are not noted below because they have a very narrow
data base, or predict behavior rather than report, or use such indirect measures of
behavior that the results are highly tenuous. See Murphy, J., dissenting in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44-46 (1949); Katz, The Supreme Court and the State: An
Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1966); Nagel,
Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wisc. L. REv.
283; and Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure
Practices,34 RocKy MT. L. Rv. 150 (1962).
28 Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practicesin
NarcoticsCases, 4 COL. J.L. & Soc. PnoBs. 87 (1968).
29 The six-month periods were September through March, 1960-61 and 196162. Additionally, data were collected for a sample of 100 cases in 1964 and 1966.
However, because the samples are so small (each of the six-month periods produced
over 2,000 cases) and because some changes in laws and police division duties
occurred in the interim, the latter data are not readily comparable with the former.
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was hidden either on the person or in the premises, this figure
dropped to around 10% in the post-Mapp period. Conversely,
reports that the arrestee dropped or otherwise visibly disposed
of the narcotics occurred only about 10% of the time prior to
Mapp, but appeared in the reports about 85% of the time after
that decision. The authors argue that the dramatic decline in
Narcotics Bureau arrests indicates that it is engaging in many
fewer illegal searches, but that they are often disguising those
they do make with false testimony. 30 In another article, Sarah
Barlow, one of the data gatherers, details this conclusion by
noting that the police report fewer instances of contraband being
located in plain view in private premises, thus indicating that
there were fewer searches of such premises after Mapp.3' In
other words, Mapp apparently had the effect of reducing the
number of illegal searches of premises (where perjury about how
the illegal substance is obtained is more difficult), but did not so
markedly reduce the number of illegal street searches (where
perjury is not so great an obstacle).3 2 The Columbia study

authors further noted that disposition patterns in the misdemeanor narcotics cases did not change dramatically after Mapp.
While dismissals of the charge and successful motions to suppress
the evidence occurred more often, the increases were hardly
dramatic; the majority of cases were still disposed of through
guilty pleas. The authors concluded that "[p]olice practices in
New York City narcotics enforcement . . . have not changed

substantially as a result of Mapp."3 3 Nevertheless, they indicated
that "the situation is better after Mapp than it was before. Even
if there is an indeterminate amount of lying today, police searchand-seizure practices are now more strictly controlled."34
Two sociologists, Donald Black and Albert J. Reiss, have also
reported observational data on police search and seizure be30 Oaks argues that this conclusion is not necessarily sound. See Oaks, supra
note 20, at 697-99, 714.
31 Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhatten Police
Practices,1960-62, 4 Caum. L. BULL. 549 (1968).
32
Barow also noted a dramatic decline in the number of women involved
in on-street arrests and suggested that narcotics officers abided by Mapp in these
instances in order to avoid the sexual overtones that court disputes about an
illegal personal search would induce. Id. at 560.
33 Comment, supra note 28, at 103.
34 Id. at 96.
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havior.3 5 The authors are interested in all phases of police-citizen
interaction and during the mid-1960's conducted extensive observation of such encounters in Boston, Chicago and Washington,
D.C. The search and seizure aspects of such interactions constitute a relatively minor part of their project, and the authors
offer no speculation or conclusions about the efficacy of the
exclusionary rule. They define a search as a physical inspection of
a person or his property which is more than a routine frisk following an arrest, and report that such searches occur in about 20%
of all police-citizen encounters. Blacks are somewhat more
frequently the targets of searches in "on-view" situations, but
there were little racial differences in "dispatched" situations.
While Black and Reiss offer no evidence or judgments about the
legality of such searches, they do note that even though the police
seldom sought explicit consent to conduct a search, contemporaneous or subsequent objections occurred only one time out of
five. The authors argue that failure to object, at least orally, is a
tacit recognition of the legitimacy, if not the legality, of the
search. Moreover, the observers in the project categorized nearly
two-thirds of the searches as "necessary" for the officers' protection or to the solution of the immediate problem. Proponents
of the exclusionary rule might find some comfort in these observations, but the 20% objection rate and the "unnecessary" onethird of the searches should render the comfort marginal.
Michael Ban, a political scientist, conducted an in-depth survey
of Mapp's impact in two cities, Boston and Cincinnati, both of
which were non-exclusionary rule locales prior to the decision.
He exhaustively searched police and court records and in addition
interviewed police, prosecutorial and judicial personnel. Although
his research was largely conducted in the mid-1960's, Ban has
only recently circulated some of his findings.3" In terms of hard
data, he noted that the issuance of search warrants in Boston
increased from about 100 annually before Mapp to nearly 1,000
3G Black and Reiss, Patterns of Police Behavior in Citizen Transactions, in 2
STUDIEs IN CIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 84-90

(1967).

36 Ban's findings are reported in two mimeographed papers, The Impact of
Mapp v. Ohio on Police Behavior (delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, May, 1973) and Local Courts v. The
Supreme Court: The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio (delivered at the annual meeting of
the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September, 1973). The
latter builds upon the former and the data cited in this paragraph are taken from it.
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by 1963, while in Cincinnati the increase was from virtually zero
to about 100. Further, he found that motions to suppress rose
from zero in both cities before 1961 to somewhat over 100 in
Boston by 1965 and to around 35 in Cincinnati during the same
time period. Approximately 25% of such motions were granted
in Boston; about 40% in Cincinnati. Ban assumed that these
records are reasonable indicators of compliance with Mapp and
concluded that the exclusionary rule's efficacy was spotty in Boston
and next to non-existent in Cincinnati. He also argued that the
low incidence of motions to suppress made or granted is not
indicative of high compliance with Mapp, but of lawyers' ignorance of or judicial defiance of the exclusionary rule. Moreover,
in his interviews Ban found an almost universal hostility to the
exclusionary rule, equally intense in both cities. He concluded
that the Cincinnati political milieu-a tight-knit political machine
which integrated the criminal justice mechanisms into its patronage and policy operations-permitted widespread disregard if not
definance of the Supreme Court's ruling. This was contrasted
with Boston's "every-man-for-himself' style of politics which
rendered participants in the criminal justice system more cautious
and compromising. In summary Ban found that the efficacy of
the exclusionary rule varies somewhat with the local political
culture. While indicating that Mapp will have some of its
hypothesized impact in some localities, Ban's conclusion offers
little succor to those who hope that the exclusionary rule will
largely curtail unconstitutional searches.
The last research work to be noted was written by James
Spiotto, who worked with Professor Oaks as a law student. An
unabashed critic of the exclusionary rule, Spiotto focused on the
incidence of motions to suppress filed and granted in Chicago at
various times during the 1960's.3 7 His major finding is that the
number of motions filed has increased considerably in recent
years in narcotics and weapons prosecutions and that motions
granted have increased somewhat in the former type of case. 8
While recognizing that frivolous motions might explain some
3
7Spiotto, supra note 26. Some of his data were gathered by Oaks and used
in his article, supra note 20, but Spiotto has added more recent data. The bulk of
Spiotto's article is devoted to correlating characteristics of the defendant or the

arrest situation with the frequency of motions to suppress and has no direct bearing

on conclusions
about the exclusionary rule's impact on police.
38
Spiotto, supranote 26.
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of the increase, he argued that 'had the exclusionary rule deterred
police from making illegal search and seizures, one might expect

the number of motions to suppress to have declined .... "39
In addition to the systematic empirical research noted here,
there is a considerable amount of what may broadly be termed
anecdotal material about the operation of the exclusionary rule.
Some of it, of course, is available to the average reader of daily
newspapers. In the spring of 1973, newspapers reported the
arrogant and highhanded raids by federal narcotics agents on
sleeping and innocent householders in Collinsville, Illinois.4 °
Subsequently the New York Times released a feature article
recounting a dozen or so similar raids conducted by both federal
and local authorities. 4 Occasionally accounts of similar dramatic
or outrageous events find their way into publication."
Those who wish to pursue it further can find descriptive
material on violations of the fourth amendment in other places.
Most notable, perhaps, is a book by Paul Chevigny entitled Police
Power.4 3 Chevigny, a New York City lawyer, devoted a section
of the book to recounting numerous instances of illegal searches
by New York police, especially those involving political dissidents
and narcotics users. 44 Some of the violations are outrageous even
to those quite unsympathetic with the exclusionary rule. As an
example, Chevigny reported that at times the police enter
premises illegally not to search for evidence but to "plant" it
for use against their enemies. Other incidents of serious police
misconduct are found in the recurring material written about
police perjury routines in New York City. One such comment
appears in a judicial opinion where New York Supreme Court

Justice Irving Younger almost openly asserts that perjured police
testimony in so-called "dropsy" cases is routine in his court.45
30

Id. at 248.

N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
See, e.g., F. WAY, LmERTY IN THE BALANCE: CUMRIENT IssuEs IN CvL
LmERTIES at 124 (2d ed. 1967); Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisalof Its Impact in New York in CRINIINAL JUSTICE ADNrmsT-&oi 261-62 (F.
Remington ed. 1969).
43 p. CHEvIGNY, POLICE PowER, POLICE ABUSES IN Nw Yom CrT (1969).
44
Id. at 180-218.
45
People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1970). See also
Younger, The Periury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596. "Dropsy" cases
refer to those where the police testify that the defendant dropped or threw away
40
41
42

(Continued on next page)
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Martin Garbus, another New York City attorney, makes a similar
charge, indicating that while the police respected the exclusionary
rule for a while after Mapp,they then "made a great discoverylying."40 Garbus further charged that the police have developed
a "plain view" perjury routine, and quoted one judge as saying
that to accept police testimony, "you have to .. .believe that
nearly every person who lives in a ghetto apartment always keeps
his doors open all the time. 41 Ghetto residents, of course, are
thought to be both qualitatively and quantitatively the greatest
victims of illegal searches and seizures. According to the Kerner
Commission report, such behavior was a primary cause of resent48
ment in general and lack of respect for the police in particular.
Indeed, in times of tension, the police have sometimes searched
whole ghetto neighborhoods without the slightest guise of le40
gality.
Law enforcement officials themselves often make little pretense of complete adherence to the exclusionary rule. Sociologist
Jerome Skolnick, after spending two years with the police in
Oakland, narratively recounts police procedures of completely
ignoring an arrestee's constitutional rights when the success of
a subsequent prosecution was not a major concern. Inconveniences
to the victim, such as making him spend money for bail, or a
night in jail, were the main object of the police. Even where
a successful prosecution was desired, the police viewed the exclusionary rule as an obstacle to be evaded in any manner possible rather than a reinforcement of citizens' constitutional liberties.r0 Occasionally high ranking police officials are candid in
substance if not in detail about such behavior vis-a-vis the fourth
amendment. 1
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the contraband thus enabling the officer to obtain the evidence without a search.
Critics charge that the police actually search the defendant and then lie about how
the evidence was acquired. For statistical evidence about the increase in testimony

about evidence obtained without a search see Barlow, supra note 31 and Comment,
supra note 28. For further discussion, see Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics
'Dropsy' Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
40 Garbus, PolicePerijury, 8 Cam. L. BuLL. 363, 368 (1972).
47 Id. at 372-73.

48 REPORT OF NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON CiviL DisoRDERs 159-61 (1968).

49 See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
50 J. SKOLNICK, JUsTnCE WrrnouT TRIAL 215-25 (1967).
51 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 13, at 442-43; LaFave, Improving Police Per-

formance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 444 (1965); and
Wilson, supra note 13, at 177.
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In the wake of these studies and reports, there have been a
number of demands for modification or abandonment of the
exclusionary rule on the grounds that it is not working. Oaks, as
noted above, has proposed its abolition. 2 Spiotto echoed this
call and proposed that a tort remedy for violations of fourth
amendment rights similar to that now prevailing in Canadian
law and practice be substituted for the rule. 53 But the agitation
for change has come from beyond the ranks of academicians
who have researched the problem. Norval Morris and Gordon
Hawkins, in their highly sensible and influential book The Honest
Politician'sGuide to Crime Control,argue that the rule should be
abandoned. 4 And more recently, an increasing number of articles
criticizing the rule have begun to appear in law reviews-some
urge abolition outright while others would merely modify its
rigidity; most offer an alternative for protecting fourth amendment
rights, but some merely criticize.55
But the most spectacular attack on the exclusionary rule was
mounted by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Dissenting at length
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named FederalNarcotics Agents,55 the
Chief Justice charged that the rule was "both conceptually sterile
52 Oaks, supra note 20, at 754-57.
53 Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-The CanadianTort Remedy and

the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POLICE Sm. & AD. 36 (1973). For the most part,
such a remedy already exists in the United States. The failure of this remedy to
deter illegal searches is what led to the adoption of the exclusionary rule. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961). Moreover, it is not at all clear that such a
remedy is a practical deterrent in Canada. The author interviewed law enforcement
officials and defense lawyers in Vancouver in the spring of 1973. While all parties
conceded that the police violated common law rights to privacy in varying degrees,
no one could remember a successful damage suit stemming from such a violation
as having occurred in recent years.

54 N. Moasus & G. HAwKINS, THE HoNEsT PoLTCIAN's GUIDE TO CRIIfE
CONTROL 100-01 (1969).
55 See, e.g., Cox, The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative to In-

justice, 4 Sw. L.J. 68 (1972); Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule, 4 TEX. TECH. U.L. REv. 317 (1973); Roche, A
Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973); Satlin, Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure:
An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule. Bivens v. Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 24 JAG J. 255 (1972); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If
the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REv. 736 (1972); and Comment, supra note
26. So far as the author can determine only one article appeared in a lav review
in 1972-73 defending the rule. See Bennett, JudicialIntegrity and JudicialReview:
An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1129 (1973).

56403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective."57
He added:
Some clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of
the Exclusionary Rule is required to justify it in view of the
high price it exacts from society-the release of countless guilty
criminals. But there is no empirical evidence to support the
claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officers.58
Burger went on to discuss several reasons why he believed the
exclusionary rule was ineffective, but these reasons can be reduced to two basic arguments: (1) "policemen do not have the
time, inclination or training" to understand the exclusionary
rule and more particularly, appellate court interpretations of it5 9
and (2) the rule applies no direct sanction to the officer who
engaged in the illegal search, and consequently has no educational
value where it is most needed. 0 The Chief Justice further
criticized the exclusionary rule as a "single, monolithic and
drastic judicial response" applied to all violations of the fourth
amendment whether flagrant or merely technical. 6' The rule, he
argued, is designed to deter deliberate rather than inadvertant
violations and it is irrational to sanction the two acts in the same
way. Burger concluded that the rule should be abandoned in
favor of an alternate scheme which protects fourth amendment
rights and yet will permit the admission of trustworthy evidence
obtained through illegal means, such as his suggestion of an
administrative or quasi-administrative remedy against the government itself based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Tri57 Id. at 415. Bivens did not turn on the exclusionary rule, but involved a suit
for federal trespass damages. The majority held that the fourth amendment
created a right to such damages even in the absence of statutory authorization.
Ironically, Burger, who advocates the establishment of alternative means of deterring illegal searches, dissented from the Court's recognition (or creation) of one
such alternative here.
58 Id. at 416.
GOld. at 416-18.
60 The policeman is too remote from the actual prosecution and trial to appreciate the ultimate result of his conduct, Burger argues. He adds that the
exclusionary rule is premised on an assumption "that law enforcement is a monolothic governmental enterprise," whereas in fact prosecutors who may lose a case
because of police misconduct have little control or direction over police procedures.
Id. at 416.
61 Id. at 418.
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bunals staffed by lawyers, he argued, would be more likely to
award damages for constiutional violations than would ordinary
jurors and the problem of collection of a judgment against the
government would be nonexistent.
The Chief Justice was not alone among his brethren in his
disillusionment with the exclusionary rule. He was joined in
general, if not in particular, by Justices Harlan and Blackmun."
The fact that Justice Harlan left the Supreme Court should not
appreciably weaken this minority. Justice Hugo L. Black left
the court along with Justice Harlan in 1971, and they were replaced by President Nixon's appointments of Justices Lewis F.
Powell and William Rehnquist, who were described in the announcement of their selection as men who favored a restoration
of the balance between "peace forces" and "criminal forces." It
would not be unexpected if their attitude toward the exclusionary
63
rule paralleled that of the first two Nixon appointees.
Besides drawing fire from the Chief Justice, the exclusionary
rule has come under attack from other influential quarters. In
1972, the American Law Institute [hereinafter referred to as ALI]
proposed in its newly adopted Model Code for Pre-Arraignment
Procedure that the rule be sharply modified.64 Under the ALI
proposal, motions to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment would be granted "only if the
court finds that the violation (of the fourth amendment) upon
which it is based was substantial."65 In determining the question
of substantiality, the Model Code calls for consideration of the
following circumstances: (1) the importance of the particular
2

Justice Harlan did not dissent in Bevins, which did not involve the exclusionary rule directly. See supra note 56. In the companion case of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), decided the same day, however, Harlan in a
concurring opinion said that "it is apparent that the law of search and seizure is
due for an overhauling," Id. at 490, and specifically called upon the Court to overrule Mapp v. Ohio. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Coolidge, made it clear that in
his view "the Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary rule." Id. at 510
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He also dissented in Bivens.
63 See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973),
and Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct.
613 (1974). Calandra constitutes the most serious denigration of the exclusionary
rule since Mapp and may well be a portent of things to come. (The Court held
by a 6-3 vote that the rule did not prohibit grand juries from making use of
seized material.)
illegally
64
AmERiCAN LAW INsTITuTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARaRGNMNT PocEDURE
§ 290.2, Comment (Official Draft No. 1, July 15, 1972).
6

65 Id.
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interest violated, (2) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct,
(8) the extent to which the violation was willful, (4) the extent
to which privacy was invaded, (5) the extent to which exclusion
will tend to prevent future violations, (6) whether, but for the
violation, the things seized would have been discovered, and (7)
the extent to which the violation prejudices the defendant's ability
to defend himself in the proceeding if the things seized are
offered in evidence against him. In their commentary the drafters
pointedly added, "substantial doubts have been expressed that
the exclusionary rule is the sole or best means of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment."""
Strong support for a similar stance developed in the American
Bar Association [hereinafter ABA]. The ABA's Section on Judicial Administration adopted such a proposal charging that the
"[R]ule [has] failed to achieve its stated purpose, but it has imposed substantial costs on society in the process."6 7 In February,
1973, the issue was squarely faced at the meeting of the ABA's
House of Delegates. Led by Professor Livingston Hall of Harvard,
many prestigious personages in the legal profession, including then
U.S. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, argued that the rule
should be modified so that only evidence obtained in substantial
violation of the Constitution would be subject to suppression.
After considerable debate, the House by a narrow 118-130 vote
refused to adopt the resolution proposing modification. 8 Because
the vote was so close and the controversy surrounding the rule
is likely to grow more salient, another effort to put the ABA
on record as favoring modification of the exclusionary rule is
quite likely.
Senator Lloyd Bentsen introduced a bill in October, 1971,
which would amend the federal criminal code to provide that
motions to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the
fourth amendment not be granted "unless the court finds, as a
matter of law, that the violation was substantial." 9 The criteria
Go
Id.
67
As quoted by Senator Bentsen in 119 CONG. REc. 2553 (daily ed. Feb. 15,
1973). The Judicial Conference of the 9th Circuit adopted a similar resolution.
0841 U.S.L.W. 2438-39 (February 20, 1973). The resolution would have
supported the Bentsen bill S. 881, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), (discussed below),
which would virtually incorporate the ALI Model Code into federal law. The opposition was led by Samuel Dash and Barnabus Sears.
69 S. 2657, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §3505(a) (1971).
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for determining substantiality were adopted almost verbatim
from the ALI MODEL CODE. The measure was referred to the
Judiciary Committee which did not report the bill out during the
92nd Congress. Senator Bentsen reintroduced his measure early
in the first session of the 93rd Congress. In addition to the substantial violation provision, the new bill provided that the United
States shall be liable for actual and punitive civil damages up to
$25,000 "for an illegal search and seizure conducted in violation
of the Constitution" by government employees.70
With the impetus of the ALI Code and the Bentsen bill,
several other groups have come out in favor of abandoning or
modifying the exclusionary rule. Perhaps the most formidable
advocate of reform is the Department of Justice, which in the
summer of 1972 announced that it was joining what it called
"the strong movement to change the Supreme Court's doctrine
that rules out the use of illegally seized evidence."71 Other groups
opposing the rule include the National Association of AttorneysGeneral, the National Association of District Attorneys, and the
Judicial Conference for the Ninth Circuit. 2 Furthermore, some
criticized the rule or indicated
state supreme courts have openly
7
thinly veiled hostility toward it. 1

In short, it appears that the exclusionary rule is about to be
overwhelmed in a rising crescendo of criticism and will suffer
considerable modification at best, and complete abolition at
worst. Everything seems to be running against it: empirical
findings, the weight of commentary in legal journals, the positions
of many prestigious national legal organizations-to say nothing
of the attitudes of the Department of Justice and the Chief Justice
of the United States. Currently the rule seems to have few vocal
defenders who are not defensive and apologetic. 4 For a doctrine
which was rather calmly accepted if not universally applauded
70 S.881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2692(a)( 1973). Senator Bentsen's remedy
is in the same vein although administratively different than that proposed by Chief

Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71 N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1972, at 19, col 1. The announcement was made by
Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson who is in charge of the Criminal
Justice Division.
72 119 CONG. REc. 2553 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1973).
73 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haefeli, 279 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1972); State
v. Bisacci, 279 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1971).
74 Even such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union have not laid stress
on defending the rule or explaining its value to the public.
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only a scant half a dozen years ago, the change has been drastic
and the future of the rule is now looking rather bleak.
II
The premise of this article is that such a hasty abandonment
of the exclusionary rule is unwise. The hue and cry that the rule
is inefficacious is based on woefully insufficient and, perhaps more
importantly, inappropriate data. It must be remembered that
the imposition of the exclusionary rule upon the nation's criminal
justice system constituted a fundamental policy change on the
part of the Supreme Court. No one will deny that important
policies should be subject to continuing reevaluation by considering feedback about their impact upon society. But the information upon which this reevaluation is based must be sufficient. It
would be folly to base decisions to continue or abandon momentous policies on a story from city X or a single data tabulation
from city Y. To do so would subordinate a broad and dispassionate consideration of justice to reactive attitudes to what could
be dramatic but relatively rare phenomena; moreover, such
excessive fluidity will give the law an undesirable "good for this
day and this train only" quality.73 Legal scholars in particular
have an obligation to avoid poorly considered judgments. Obviously, it its difficult for us to make a complete and thorough
appraisal of the impact of even the most important policies, but
some extended investigation is invariably possible and should be
pursued as far as our resources permit. Certainly, at any rate,
given the importance of the policies underlying the exclusionary
rule, the investigation should be carried out to the extent of
feasibility.
In the 1972-73 academic year the author conducted research
on a modest scale into the impact of the exclusionary rule on
search and seizure behavior. Crime statistics were gathered on
a widespread basis as opposed to Oaks' statistics for one city;
questionnaires pertaining to search and seizure practices were
sent to police departments, prosecutors and public defenders in
over 180 cities, and interviews were conducted with such officials
in ten cities. Much of this data is presented and discussed in
Section III. The findings are not presumed to be conclusive; no
75 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944)

(Roberts, J., dissenting).
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one can argue from them that it is manifestly obvious that the
exclusionary rule is highly efficacious or that it is a total failure.
Nevertheless in the author's judgment they do indicate that to a
considerable extent the rule is producing the impact that was
intended. Moreover, it is further submitted that there is good
reason to believe that this impact is becoming more profound
with time.
Meanwhile, the remainder of this section will explain why
the evidence heretofore collected which bears on the exclusionary
rule's efficacy is insufficient and largely inappropriate. Principally, there are three reasons why this existing evidence is
largely inconclusive.
First, the evidence is insufficient because it is drawn from an
insufficient sample. This applies almost by definition to anecdotal
or participant observer experiences such as those of Chevigny or
Skolnick. Less obviously this deficiency is also present in the
more systematic empirical findings described in Section Iespecially when they are considered independently. Oaks' study
of arrest rates before and after Mapp focused on the single city
of Cincinnati, which may or may not be typical. Indeed, there
may be no "typical" reaction. It is worth recalling in this context
that Ban's comparison of official reaction to Mapp in Cincinnati
and Boston on other dimensions found a discernably lesser
propensity for compliance in Cincinnati than in Boston. Likewise,
Spiotto's finding of the high frequency with which motions to
suppress are made and granted came only from the city of
Chicago. Similar data which Oaks collected in Washington, D.C.
showed drastically reduced frequencies. 6 Clearly Chicago's motion to suppress statistics cannot be adjudged typical without
further comparative data. The Columbia Law School study,
which supported a conclusion that the exclusionary rule was
ignored by patrolmen and sometimes evaded through perjury
by the Narcotics Bureau, occurred in New York City, which is
not noted for its typicality in much of anything. Moreover, the
authors of the Columbia study concluded that the rule was not
completely inefficacious. While the Black and Reiss study of
police-citizen interactions was based on observations from three
76

Oaks, supra note 20, at 693-96.
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cities, the focus on search and seizure was a minor one and their
data are not given to very clear conclusions.
Because each of these findings has relied upon a different
measure for determining the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule,
we have analyzed each research finding separately to demonstrate the insufficiency of the data on any given measure. Of
course when all the results are considered together (as must
eventually be done), it might be fair to treat them as an indictment of the exclusionary rule's adequacy. But it is not sufficient
for conviction. Because of the difficulty of collecting large amounts
of data in this area, even this insufficiency might be overlooked
if there were no other problems in arriving at a conclusion. We
are not, however, without other difficulties.
A second and more serious problem is the fact that much of
the evidence damning the exclusionary rule, as well as the perspective dictating its collection, is quite dated. Most of the
research projects used Mapp as a demarcation line for a before
and after approach. The Columbia Law School study largely
relied upon data taken within a year before or after the decision,
while Oaks' and Ban's data encompassed approximately four
years prior to or following it. Obviously there are compelling
reasons for collecting data immediately before and after a particular event for purposes of assessing its impact. To delay too
long is risky; the particular type of data sought may disappear,
become incomparable to that collected before the event, or become incapable of reconstruction. Worse yet, as time goes on
other events will contaminate the influence of the subject event
and weaken or fatally destroy the viability of conclusions about
its impact. Nonetheless, in evaluating the effect of the exclusionary rule on the behavior of law enforcement personnel with an
eye toward making the public policy decision of whether to
retain, modify or abandon the rule, we must be interested in its
present, rather than past, significance. Unless we can be reasonably sure that the impact of the exclusionary rule in the fall of
1961 or 1964 or at any other date in the past has persisted without
great change until the present time, the value of such before and
after studies focusing on a relatively short time period surrounding
Mapp is limited indeed. In light of the author's research discussed
in the next section, it is not at all clear that the behavior of law
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enforcement officials in searching for and seizing evidence and
contraband has remained unchanged since the early 1960's.
Beyond this, there is an even more important reason for
treating such data gingerly. This is that before-after type studies
are based on the theoretical expectation that if behavior is going
to change in response to a given stimuli, it will change immediately
after the event. But experience often belies this theory, particularly in the case when the sudden imposition of a new policy
requires fundamental readjustments in patterns of thinkcing and
habits of behavior. Consequently, changes-if they occur at allwill occur slowly rather than instantaneously. This is especially
true of Supreme Court decisions where the communications and
control mechanisms between the Court and the recipients of the
policy are quite tenuous. Information about high court decisions
is often poorly disseminated, easily misunderstood, or ignored
in deference to habit and convenience. 77 Eventually, however,
many Supreme Court policies have succeeded in altering the
behavior of those to whom they were addressed.7 8 This is not to
say that this is necessarily the case with the exclusionary rule,
but it is to say that we cannot willy-nilly extrapolate findings
from the early 1960's to the early 1970's.
There is a third reason for caution in regard to the applicability of these older data. This is the problem that beforeafter studies rest on the assumption that the stimulus expected to
cause change is a singular concrete event. In one way, of course,
the Mapp decision conforms to this assumption. Yet in another
way appearances of a singular event are deceiving. While Mapp
forbade the introduction of illegally seized evidence in criminal
cases, the decision did not say what constituted an illegal seizure
of evidence. This was determined in piecemeal pronouncements
later in the decade-sometimes much later.70 Consequently, in
77 See N. MILNER, Tim COURT AND LocAL LAw ENFORCEMENT: THE I AcT
OF MmANDA (1971), and Wasby, The Communication of the Supreme Court's

Criminal Procedure Decisions: A Preliminary Mapping, 18 VIL. L. BEv. 1086
(1973).
78
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is the most salient example.
This is discussed further in Section IV, infra.
79 Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 94
S. Ct. 467 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Whitley v.

Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Vale

v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 TJ.5.
(Continued on next page)
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the first few years following Mapp, the states had varied and
often quite loose definitions about what constituted an illegal
search (especially in non-exclusionary rule states). Quite often
it was not very difficult for state and local officials to find many
ongoing practices congruent with these definitions. By the early
1970's, of course, the states had lost much of their flexibility in
defining an illegal search so that search and seizure behavior
thought acceptable in the early 1960's was often unacceptable a
decade later. 80 Given the differences in standards between the
two periods, there is much danger in considering findings from
the former relevant to the latter period.
A third weakness in the existing evidence relates not as much
to the findings in the previously discussed material per se as to
the perspective in which the research was undertaken and the
findings featured. Most of the researchers have either sought out
evidence of the exclusionary rule's failure or upon finding it they
have spotlighted it in their discussions. In varying degrees this
is certainly the case with Oaks, Spiotto, Ban and the Columbia
Law School study. And clearly the whole point of the illustrations
of Chevigny, Garbus and Skolnick was to dramatize the illegal
searches and evasive tactics practiced by the police. Of course,
such a perspective is not unnatural. Normally compliance with
a law or court decision is considered routine while non-compliance
is dramatic and unexpected. The point is, however, that in cases
like the exclusionary rule, we might well adopt an opposite perspective-or at least some researchers should do so. For, as noted
earlier, in situations such as this immediate compliance is not
the norm; old habits and local policies are quite likely to continue
relatively unchanged for some time. Despite this, nobody has
searched for evidence or illustrations of compliance with the fourth
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

543 (1968); Sbron v. New 'York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1967); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 102 (1965); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); and Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
80 Cases such as Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S.Ct, 488 (1973); Robinson v. United
States, 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973); Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Terry v.
Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); and Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 48 (1967) held that search procedures which many state and
local officials had refused to apply (officially at least) in the belief that they were
illegal were constitutional. Some state supreme courts had held them illegal. See,
e.g., State v. Ellins, 422 P.2d 250 (Ore. 1966); Ellis v. State, 364 S.W.2d 925
(Tenn. 1963); and Barnes v. State, 130 N.W.2d 264 (Wisc. 1964).
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amendment as a result of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, when
compliance is found, it is not given prominence but rather is
treated with all the excitement of finding an old shoe. In short,
at least some researchers should have turned the perspective upside down; non-compliance should have been expected as routine
while significant changes in police search and seizure behavior
should have been considered unusual and noteworthy.
Hypothetically, it can be argued that police compliance with
the goals enunciated in Mapp increased significantly relative to
the 1950's after the decision was handed down in 1961, but, of
course, did not attain anything like full compliance with the
fourth amendment. Because existing research had been premised
upon the conventional perspective that compliance was the
norm, therefore it could not gainsay this argument. Furthermore,
it can be argued hypothetically that by the early 1970's, police
behavior was even more consistent with the goals of Mapp. Perhaps something approaching full compliance with the fourth
amendment is a likely possibility in the not too distant future.
It is with this reversed perspective and hypothetical argument
in mind that the author conducted his research.
III
This section describes some significant findings of the author's
research into the impact and efficacy of the exclusionary rule.
The scope of the study was broad and this is not a comprehensive
report of the results. 8 ' The emphasis here is quantitative; limitations of time and space preclude an extensive analysis of the
more qualitative aspects of the research, such as interviews with
81 The data came from the following sources: (1)

compilation of arrest

statistics from the annual police reports or FBI figures for about 40 cities, (2) col-

lation of pertinent material from police operating manuals, bulletins or training
manuals in about 40 cities, (3) interviews with police officials, prosecutors and

public defenders in ten large cities, and (4) questionnaires sent to and returned
by police departments, prosecutors offices and public defenders' offices in all
American
cities
100,000
population
(except
five
used for pre-test
purposes).
Return rates
on over
the 44
questionnaire
were:
Police
47.4%;
departments,
prosecutors,
out of 125 or
35.2%;
defenders,
33 out62of out of 131 or
82 or 40.2%.

cities have such organizations.)
(TheNot
smaller
public defender
recipients is due to the fact that not all
all ofnumber
the dataofgathered
bears directly
on the question of the exclusionary
rule's efficacy. Some of it focuses upon such matters as communications
of court
decisions within the criminal justice system, relationships between police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and officials' attitudes toward the exclusionary rule
and criminal procedure generally.
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police officials and substantial changes in police training. The
author believes, however, that the thrust of the quantitative findings herein reported will not be belied or radically modified by
such material. Four types of data are reported. The first is an
expansion of the type of data Oaks collected for Cincinnati.
The second involves either hard figures or officials' estimates of the
number of search warrants issued at certain periods of time
in large American cities. The third focuses on recent changes in
police search and seizure policies in such cities, while the fourth
involves participants' estimates of the frequency of pretrial disposition by dropping charges by police or prosecutor and of
motions granted to suppress evidence in search and seizure types
of crimes in such cities.
A. Arrest in Search-and-Seizure Types of Crimes
Oaks, it will be recalled, compiled arrest statistics from Cincinnati for the 1956-67 period and concluded that the imposition
of the exclusionary rule in 1961 had virtually no effect on the
propensity of the police to make arrests for narcotics and weapons
offenses, although he conceded some likelihood that the decision
reduced the number of gambling arrests. It was argued in Section
II, however, that data from one city was an insufficient base upon
which to build a generalization about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule. Consequently, we have gathered similar data for 14 cities
which did not have the rule prior to Mapp.82 In addition to the
82 The data were collected from annual police department reports on file at the
Wisconsin Criminal Justice Library in Madison. This library has one of the most
extensive collections of such reports in the nation. Reports from about 20 large
cities in non-exclusionary rule states prior to 1961 are located there. However,
several missing reports or drastic changes in the report formats rendered the data
from some of them too incomplete for use here. (Some missing data were obtained by directly contacting the relevant police department, but such requests
were not always answered.) In five of the 14 cities used here, there are one or
tvo missing reports, but they occur at times not likely to impair seriously an analysis
of trends.
Statistics were collected from 1956-66 inclusively. (The 1967 figures were
excluded largely because narcotics arrests began rising rapidly in the wake of
their large scale use by middle class youths.) The particular nature of the charges
in any given arrest category may vary slightly from city to city, but it should be
emphasized that we are looking at changes across time in a particular city. We are
not making comparisons between cities or aggregating findings.
In reporting his Cincinnati data, Oaks also recordfed convictions. These figures
do not often appear in police reports and are much more difficult to obtain.
Although such data were found for five of the cities, they are not reported here. In
Oaks' study, the conviction figures did not significantly-add to or detract-from" his
arguments, just as those which we have obtained do not do so here. "
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three crimes Oaks used, we have recorded arrests for possessing
or receiving stolen property, an offense for which evidence is
often obtained by search and seizure.
The data show that the Cincinnati experience relied upon by
Oaks is not necessarily typical. Contrast the arrests there (shown
in Figure 1) with those in Baltimore (shown in Figure 2) or
those in Buffalo (shown in Figure 3). In Baltimore, the decreases
in arrests following Mapp were both dramatically sudden and
truly spectacular; one would be hard pressed to attribute them in
large measure to anything but the imposition of the exclusionary
rule. Even in 1965 the arrest rates for all crimes except gambling
were significantly less than they were in 1960 (and for gambling
they were significantly lower in 1962-64). In Buffalo the decreases
in arrests were not so spectacular but were quite noticeable.
More importantly, it is apparent that a monotonic increase in
arrests for all crimes except weapons offenses was halted in 1962
(except for gambling where the decline began in 1963). By 1965,
arrest figures for two crimes were considerably lower than those
for 1960, and the arrests in the other two were only slightly
above those in 1960.83 The conclusion that police behavior in
Buffalo was affected by the imposition of the exclusionary rule
is certainly tenable.
Figure 1
Arrests in Cincinnati, 1956-67
Stolen Property

Weapons

Narcotics

Gambling

1956
1957

180
169

382
380

97
84

894
879

1958

231

337

77

891

1959
1960

198
235

216
237

59
70

699
858

1961 ......................
328 ......................
220......................
52.........586
1962
313
189
72
369
1963
340
202
53
500
1964
381
194
54
385
1965
326
185
45
296
1966
251
219
45
408
1967
390
270
82
204
Source: Cincinnati Police Department, Annual Reports.
83 Except for the large increase in narcotics arrests, the same would be true
for the 1966 arrests.
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1956
1957
1958
1959

Figure 2
Arrests in Baltimore, 1956-65
Stolen Property Weapons
Narcotics
166
1341
324
144
1324
239
241
1343
435
350

1452

239

Gambling
434
512
849
577

1960
488
1559
502
623
1961 ......................
294 ......................
936 ....................
221 ......................
345
1962
274
1031
275
467
1963
163
1120
314
328
1964
171
1326
368
192
1965
168
1030
378
996
Source: Baltimore Police Department, Annual Reports. Data for 1966 are
unavailable.

Figure 3

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
........

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

Arrests in Buffalo, 1956-66
Stolen Property Weapons
Narcotics
41
148
76
46
137
62
68
152
68
67
108
87
72
125
112
....

57
44
65
81
81

......

97
94
113
127
147

Gambling
91
90
93
126
171

°....

......

69
110
80
83
173

222
137
154
102
92

Source: Buffalo Police Department, Annual Reports. Data for 1961 are
unavailable.

It should be understood that Baltimore and Buffalo are not
being paraded as "typical." Baltimore is probably an extreme
case and is illustrated to counter Oaks' generalizations about the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule from the presentation of Cincinnati's arrest figures. Buffalo is less extreme, but not necessarily
typical. Indeed, it is not at all clear that there is a typical response
to the exclusionary rule. Rather, if the arrest figures we have
gathered are indicative, response patterns vary considerably
from city to city. Moreover, there is variation from crime to
crime: arrests for gambling and weapons offenses seem to have
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been frequently affected, but stolen property and narcotics arrest
rates were impaired in fewer locales. Space precludes setting
forth the arrest figures for each of the 14 cities here, but Figure
4 gives a summary account of their relationship to the imposition
of the exclusionary rule. A look at it shows that only four other
cities, Boston, Dayton, New Orleans and New York have the
rather minimal response pattern that Cincinnati has. At the other
end of the spectrum, Mapp apparently had a significant impact in
Baltimore and Buffalo (as we have seen), as well as Philadelphia
and perhaps Akron. The remaining five cities show differentiated
results; figures for some crimes lend support to arguments for
the rule's efficacy while others support the opposite contention.
Figure 4
Relationship Between Arrest Rates and Imposition of the
Exclusionary Rule in 14 Cities
Stolen Property Weapons
Narcotics Gambiing
Akro
Atlanita
Balthnore
Bost( n
Buffa lo
Cinc innati
Clev eland
Col mbus (Ohio)
Dayt on
Denyrer
New ark
New Orleans
New York
Phila delphia

*

A

*

A

X
A
X
B
X
B
X
X
C
X
X
X
A

C
A
X
C
X
X
A
X
X
A
A
C
A

X
A
X
B
X
X
X

A
C
A
A
A
C
A
X
C
A
X
X
A

X
C
X
X
X

Key
X = No clear effect. Includes declines in arrest rates where trend began prior to
1961.
A = Permanent decrease. Arrest rates following Mapp average at least 10% less
than those before Mapp.
B = Levelling off. Arrest rates increase in years preceding 1961 and remain
steady (perhaps increasing slightly by 1965 or 1966) thereafter.
C = Impermanent decrease. A decline of 20% or more in arrest rates in 1962 or
1963 and lasting at least two years, but with an increase substantially above
the pre-Mapp rates thereafter.
= Indeterminate. Too few arrests for analysis or change in reporting format
makes comparison impossible.
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This discussion should not be read as an argument that a
leveling-off or decline in arrest rates was necessarily caused by
imposition of the exclusionary rule. Obviously, arrest rates are
affected by changes in local crime situations or law enforcement
priorities. Gambling in particular is subject to such factors.
(Gambling arrests declined, usually rather substantially in 11 of
the 14 cities, however, and it is unlikely that such a widespread
phenomenon was the chance product of entirely local factors.)
As indicated in Section II, we could not fairly expect police
behavior to change radically in the years immediately following
Mapp, and a before and after type of comparison using arrest
rates is not particularly adequate for our purposes. Consequently,
our argument is negative rather than positive; we are maintaining
that the evidence from the 14 cities certainly does not support a
conclusion that the exclusionary rule had no impact upon arrests
in search-and-seizure type crimes in the years following its imposition.
B. Numbers of Search WarrantsIssued
Another way to measure the exclusionary rule's effectiveness
is to look at the changes, if any, which occurred in police use of
search warrants following Mapp. If their employment of search
warrants does not increase or increases only slightly, it seems
likely that either (1) the police have never been engaging in
illegal searches or (2) they are continuing to engage in illegal
searches at about the same rate as before the imposition of the
rule. Conversely, if the use of search warrants increases considerably, it is likely that either (1) the police formerly never engaged
in any significant number of searches and are now doing so
or (2) that the police are now engaging in a greater proportion
of constitutional searches at the expense of what had heretofore
been illegal ones.84
84
third alternative is logically possible to explain an increase in search warrants: namely, a drastic increase in all types of searches (le al and illegal) following
Map p. However, there is no reason to expect such a sudden change in policy and
no evidence to suggest that it occurred.
The issuance of a search warrant to the police is indicative of their effort to
follow constitutionally prescribed patterns. But it does not necessarily mean that
the warrant is constitutionally valid. Thus a fourth alternative is also possible:
namely, that large numbers of warrants are issued but are later voided. While
this may have been a real possibility in a few localities, the questionnaire data and
interviews make it clear that this was not a general occurrence.
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Of course, the above alternatives do not constitute an absolute
either-or choice. It is possible and in some cases likely that both
possibilities contribute to the situation. But it seems clear that
the police were engaged in relatively frequent illegal searches
when there was no exclusionary rule. Everyone writing on the
question assumes this; certainly no one has argued to the contrary
on any kind of -aggregate basis.85 It is likely then that both
alternatives labeled (1) postulating low levels of illegal search
activity prior to Mapp, are not very viable. This leaves us with
the alternatives labeled (2). One of them supports a conclusion
that the exclusionary rule is efficacious while the other suggests
that it is not. In order to draw a conclusion, we need to obtain
data on the issuance of search warrants.
Data such as this, however, are not easily obtained. This is
particularly the case when we -are seeking data for a decade or
more in the past. Police and judicial clerks simply did not compile
such statistics. One is left to making his own compilations from
the scattered case files, relying on the few printed estimates
published at that time or on current estimates of officials who
served at that time.
The evidence, such as it is, indicates that search warrants were
a rare phenomenon indeed prior to 1961 in cities where no exclusionary rule prevailed. In Minneapolis, no search warrants at
all were issued over several years time in the 1950's,8 6 while in
other sizeable cities the number issued was amazingly low.87 The
most comprehensive figures are those laboriously compiled by
Ban in his study of the exclusionary rule in Cincinnati and
Boston.88 His data (reprinted in Figure 5) make it obvious that
search warrants were almost non-existent in the former city and
used only modestly in the latter. It is also obvious that their use
increased dramatically in both cities immediately following Mapp.
8

5Acknowledgement of widespread illegal searches by the police prior to
Mapp can be found in statements of various law enforcement officials collated in
Kamisar, supra note 13. See also Murphy, The Problem of Compliance by Police
Departments, 44 TEx. L. Bxv. 989, 941 (1966).
86 Kamisar, upra note 18, at 441. See also Linse, Due Process in Practice: A
Study of Police Procedures in Minneapolis, 1966 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in
University of Minnesota library).
87 Weinstein, supra note 27, at 177, indicates that less than 25 search warrants
a year were issued in Denver before Mapp. Murphy, supranote 85, at 941, indicates
that New York City police "rarely used" search warrants prior to Mapp. A few of
interviewees recalled similarly low figures for their own cities.
the author's
88
Ban, supra note 36.
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Figure 5
Search Warrants Obtained by Police in Cincinnati and Boston
1958-65
1958
1959
1960
1961
(Jan.-May)
1961
(June-Dec.)
1962
1963
1964
1965

Cincinnati
3
0
7

Boston
176
186
267

3

150

25
38
100
113
89

538
834
940
574
560

Source: Ban, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Behavior, supra note 36,

at 10.

An even more dramatic upswing in police use of search warrants
was recorded in New York City,8 9 and estimates of sizeable increases have come from other cities." Nonetheless, it must be
pointed out that in some populous cities police reliance on search
warrants remained disproportionately small. With only about 100
warrants issued annually in Cincinnati in the mid-1960's, their
use cannot be accounted as common there. It seems that a
similarly low figure prevailed in Los Angeles. 91 To pose a conclusion on rather sparse data then, it would appear that following
Mapp the police generally engaged in a greater proportion of
constitutional searches at the expense of what had heretofore been
illegal ones, but the increase in the proportion varied con92
siderably.
As discussed in Section II, we are more interested in the
exclusionary rule's impact today than ten years ago. This per89 Murphy, supra note 85, at 941.

00 Kamisar, supra note 13; Weinstein, supra note 27; Linse, supra note 86.

91 Los Angeles began keeping exact search warrant statistics in 1968, when
207 were issued. Although data are not available from earlier years, it does not
seem likely that a significantly larger number of search warrants would have been
issued then. (Ostensibly, California was not affected by the Mapp decision, but
the state had adopted the exclusionary rule only a few years prior to Mapp, in
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
92 The key word here is proportion. We cannot necessarily conclude that the
police are engaged in any fewer illegal searches.
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spective makes it worthwhile to obtain recent data on police use
of search warrants. Here we are aided by the fact that a few
cities have recently begun compiling exact figures; the author
has obtained half a dozen such compilations. However, to obtain
a broader base of information, police and prosecutorial respondents to the author's questionnaire were asked to estimate the
number of search warrants sought or issued annually.9 3 These
ranged from a low of 30 in Lincoln, Nebraska, to 3,500 in Chicago. 94 The average for 80 cities responding was 440. 95 The
average population for these same cities is 391,000. Thus as a

rough rule of thumb the average police department in a metropolitan area seeks 1.1 search warrants a year for every 1,000
persons. Clearly, this is a significant increase from the pre-Mapp
days."' Of course averages hide disparities and our data make it

clear that some police departments were much more frequent in
their use of search warrants than others. In Mobile, Alabama, a
93 The exact wording was "Approximately how many search warrants per year
does your department request these days?" for police respondents, and "Approximately how many search warrants per year are issued in this jurisdiction these
days?" for prosecutorial respondents.
94 The New York City police did not answer this question, but it appears that
they use in excess of 3,000 search warrants annually. Murphy, supra note 85, says
that almost 18,000 were used by the police in the five year period of 1961-66.
95 For 17 of the 80 cities, answers to this query were received from both the
police and prosecutor's office. Prosecutors are usually elected on a county-wide
basis and thus often serve a population considerably larger than a central city.
Thus it is not surprising that in 11 of the cities, the prosecutors' estimates were
higher than those of the police; the reverse was true in four cases and in two the
estimates coincided exactly. In most localities, however, it seems that most search
warrant requests come from the central city. Consequently, we can use these
17 cities as something of a check on the accuracy of the respondents' estimates.
In 12 of them the two were reasonably comparable i.e., the prosecutors' estithatpolice
of the police by more than 50% and, if
mates, ifwere
greater,
did not
smaller,
at least
75%exceed
of the
estimate. In three cities where the
prosecutors' estimates exceeded those of the police by more than 50%, telephone
search
use of
resultpolice
of frequent
likely(e.g.,
the state
this was most
that
interviews
warrants byrevealed
other law
enforcement
agencies
or alcoholic
beverage
units).
In
two
cities
where
the
prosecutors'
estimates
wvere
both
around
30%
of
that of the police, no explanations of the disparity were available. On the vhole,
it seems that the respondents' estiates are rough reflections of reality. Like all
approximations,
noneBecause
can be itconsidered
perfectly
and a few
perhaps
quite far off base.
is the police
use ofaccurate,
search warrants
thatareprarily
interests us, their estimates are used for these 17 cities here and in subsequent
discussions.
96A chec was made against the possibility that these figures reflect differences
between
exclusionary
rule prior
1961 andforthose
which
did not. those
This cities
is notwhich
the bad
case:thethe
average number
of towarrants
pre-Mapp
exclusionary rule cities is 455; for non-exclusionary rule cities is 428. Both groups
have an
ratio
of 1.1 search
warrants
per with
1,000which
persons.
It might
be
noted
thatapproximate
no evidence
is available
on the
frequency
search
warrants
were used in cities having the exclusion re before 1961. An iference that
it was not very frequent can be drawn from Katz, supra note 27.
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town of less than 200,000, the police sought 1,308 search warrants in 1972, or well over six for every 1,000 persons. By contrast,
in Kansas City, Missouri, with nearly 500,000 people, the police
used only 120 search warrants, or about 0.25 for every 1,000 persons. A few other cities approached these extremes but most were
bunched around the average. To some extent differences in the
use of search warrants might reflect such local factors as the
incidence of crime, the peculiarities of state laws and the
propensity of judges to issue warrants in marginal requests. 7
But most likely the disparity also reflects the degree to which
the police and other law enforcement agencies have altered their
behavior in response to the imposition of the exclusionary rule
and subsequent decisions governing the admissibility of evidence.
To determine how the current use of search warrants relates
to the use of warrants in prior years, the respondents were also
asked: "How does this (figure) compare with the number sought
five or six years ago?" It was a closed-answer question with five
alternatives: (1) It is a decrease, (2) No great change, (3) It is
50% to 100% greater, (4) It is 100% to 200% greater, and (5) It
is more than 200% greater. This comparison will give us some
perspective on any recent trends in police use of search warrants
without resorting to estimates that predate the great upsurge in
the use of narcotics. It will also give us some indication of the
impact of the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Chimel v. California. 8 In some ways, Chimel is appropriate for a before-andafter type analysis. There the Court held that searches made
contemporaneous with an arrest were constitutionally restricted
to areas immediately under the arrestee's control (i.e., clothing or
areas within arm reach). Prior to Chimel, wide-ranging searches
contemporaneous with an arrest were frequently carried out in
some localities and often arrests were timed so as to enable officers
to search a suspect's premises or automobile. Chimel had the
effect of closing an important gap in the search and seizure law
which enabled the police to conduct legally broad searches for
evidence or contraband without fear of the consequences of the
97 There was some regional variation in the use of search warrants. Southern
police departments relied on them to a much greater extent than those in the Midwest. Interview answers and questionnaire comments indicated that some of this
was attributable to the more restrictive alcoholic beverage control laws in the South.
08 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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exclusionary rule. Many law enforcement officials denounced
Chimel, asserting that it would cause the police grievous inconvenience and allow more criminals to escape conviction. 9 Several
legal writers predicted significant changes in police search practices (including a greater use of search warrants) if they were to
abide by the decision. 100
The comparison of present estimates with those of 1967-68
is shown in Figure 6.101 Quite clearly the use of search warrants
has increased greatly over this short period of time. Virtually
four-fifths of the cities reported a rise of 502 to 100% or more,
Figure 6
Changes in Use of Search Warrants Between 1967-68 and 1973
No. of Cities
1978 Figure is:
2
( 3%)
A Decrease
(18%)
13
Change
No Great
(45%)
33
50% to 100% Greater
(16%)
12
Greater
to
200%
100%
(19%)
14
200% or Greater
(101%)*
74
and for nearly one-fifth of them the increase was a dramatic
200% or more. Nor are such estimates the products of respondents' failing memories; exact records show an increase in Detroit
from 45 in 1968 to 1,657 in 1972; in Los Angeles from 207 in
1968 to 999 in 1972; and in St. Paul from 55 in 1967 to 118 in
1972.102 Needless to say, the crime rate has not increased during
the reported years at a rate that would even approach this
increase. Of course, while we have deliberately chosen a period
9 0 For such comments, see Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 No= DAmE LAw 559 (1970).
100 Id. See also, e.g., Burnett, Search Warrants: Impact and Application of
Chimel and Spinelli and Related Problems, 29 Fa. BAn. J.170 (1970); Note,
Police Practices and Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1465 (1971); Note, Searches and Seizures: The Chimel Decision and Police
Procedures,6 CALIF. WESTmnN L. REv. 164 (1969).
101 There were responses from only 74 of the 80 cities in which the 1973
search warrant figures were estimated.
* Total greater than 100% due to rounding.
102 Sources for these figures are: Detroit, letter from Richard J. Padzieski,
Deputy Chief Prosecuting Attorney for Wayne County, June 11, 1973; Los Angeles,
letter from Joseph L. Car, Director, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
June 8, 1973; St. Paul, conversation with "Bud' Hudson, Clerk of the Municipal
Court, May 23, 1973. The Detroit figures reflect only those search warrants sought
(Continued on next page)
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which predated Chimel and post-dated the beginning of the
"narcotics explosion" among middle class youths, narcotics offenses have risen considerably since that time. 10 3 Consequently,
we cannot confidently attribute the increased use of search warrants entirely or even primarily to police reaction to the exclusionary rule.
While an objective determination of causality is impossible,
we did ask the respondents what percentage of the increase
could be attributed to: (1) increases in narcotics offenses, (2) the
effect of one or more judicial rulings, (3) more and better
trained police officers, and (4) other causes. The answers'04 gave
the narcotics upsurge the lion's share of the credit; the mean percentage of attribution was 55%. Judicial rulings had a mean attribution of 24%; more police and better training, 22%; and
other, 4%. These means, however, hide a wide range of responses.
The spectrum of attribution to judicial rulings is shown in Figure
7, which shows a clear tendency for the impact of such rulings to
vary drastically from city to city. In about one-third of the
Figure 7
Percentage of Responsibility for Increased Search Warrants
Attributed to Judicial Rulings
Percentage

Number of Cities Responding

(35%)

Less than 10%

17

10%-24%
25%-49%

7
14

50%-74%
75% - 100%

6
5

(29%)
(12%)
(10%)

49

(100%)

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(14%)

with the cooperation of the Wayne County prosecutor's office. In conversation Mr.
Padzieski estimated that this covered about 90% of the warrants issued in Wayne
County in 1972 but only about 50% to 60% in 1968. Even with this adjustment,
however, Detroit's increase remains startling. In fairness, it should be noted that
Mobile which has also kept search warrant records for some years, recorded no
great c!ange, going from 1,208 in 1967 to 1,308 in 1972 (letter from Lt. William
H. Mingus, Mobl e Police Dept., May 24, 1973). As noted in the text, however,
Mobile has one of the highest search warrant to population ratios in the nation.
Subsequent to 1968 several other cities have begun compiling search warrant
statistics.
103 In 1968, there were 2,234.8 major crimes per 100,000 people in the
United States; in 1972 the rate was 2.,829.5/100,000, an increase of 26.6%. Narcotics arrests went from 111.6/100,000 to 269.1/100 000 an increase of 135.8%.
(Figures are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports for the United States).
04 In 15 of the 74 cities, there was no increase (see Figure 6). There were
49 valid responses from the 59 cities where an increase was reported.
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cities court decisions are seen as having little if any relationship
to the recent increase in search warrants whereas in about onequarter of them major if not total responsibility is attributed to
judicial action. This variation seems to reflect the differential
impact of the Chimel decision. In cities attributing upwards of
50% of the increase to judicial rulings, Chimel was almost universally given the credit (or blame), even though the respondents
were not requested to name any particular decision. Explanations
on the questionnaire or from subsequent interviews revealed
that at least some of these police departments had frequently
used arrests as an excuse, or at least an opportunity, to conduct
broad ranging searches and that Chimel had caused them to
resort to search warrants in much greater numbers. A disproportionate number of these estimated an increase of over 200%o
in the use of warrants since 1967-68. On the other hand, a greater
number of police departments apparently did not often rely on
this device as a vehicle for conducting searches and thus attributed their often more modest warrant increases to rising
narcotics offenses or other causes.
As an explanatory factor, the narcotics phenomenon is not
mutually exclusive to the exclusionary rule. While increased use
of narcotics is undoubtedly the immediate cause behind the
increase in the use of search warrants in a great many cities, it
can be asked: why do the police seek search warrants in narcotics
cases rather than operating without them? In good part at least
the answer lies with judicial decisions governing the legality of
searches and the rule excluding illegally seized material from
evidence. In other words, the narcotics phenomenon explains to a
large extent the tremendous increase in police use of search
warrants during the past half dozen years, but it does not explain
police decisions to seek search warrants rather than operate without them. The exclusionary rule explains this.
In summary, there clearly has been a significant increase in
the use of search warrants by police in comparison to the period
prior to Mapp. It is commonly conceded that (at least in nonexclusionary rule areas) search warrants were a rarity and that
the police conducted numerous illegal searches before the exclusionary rule was applied to the states in Mapp. In contrast to
this, metropolitan police now use roughly 1.1 search warrants

715

THE ExcLusioNARY RuLE

1974]

(D(

0

0Q

0

0

0Pk

Ci

:-

oc

0
P..

~

~

D

W

o

o-

(0

10 00)m

-1

KENTUCKY LAW Jout[6AL

[Vol. 62

-ayear for every 1,000 persons. In some places the increase seems
to have come in the years following Mapp while in others it has
come more recently as a result of Chimel and the upsurge in
narcotics use. Nevertheless, in all but a few cities, the increase
is now of such magnitude that we can believe that a greater
proportion of current police searches follow constitutional guidelines than was the case before the imposition of the exclusionary
rule.
C. Changes in Police Search and Seizure Policies
The impact of the exclusionary rule as tightened by the constraints of Chimel can be measured in another way, namely by
noting the extent police department policies regarding search and
seizure incident to arrest have changed since 1967-68. It is recognized that due to the fact that statements of policy often do not
represent actual behavior, this could be a weaker measure of
the effectiveness of the rule. No doubt such statements were
sometimes unduly generalized to conform with the sparsely
worded questionnaire alternatives. In addition, some policies
could be misreported so that they will appear to be in conformity
with the law. Even when accurately reported, it does not follow
that a policy reflects behavior in the field. Nonetheless, such
information is useful. Some departments did admit to policies
apparently or arguably in opposition to United States Supreme
Court decisions. Moreover, while field behavior may not always
conform to headquarters policy, it can be argued that police
officers as members of a paramilitary organization do not lightly
disregard directives from their superiors. Most importantly, a
focus on policy rather than on a quantitative measure of behavior
may enable us to separate Chime's impact from that of the
narcotics phenomenon. The latter is clearly not going to produce
more restrictive search and seizure policies.
Figure 8 reveals that a great change in police department
policies regarding search of premises contemporaneous with
arrest has occurred over the last six years. Since 1969 the first
alternative, "searches are limited to area immediately under the
suspect's control," is the only specific policy which is constitutionally permissible. 1 5 The rapidity in adoption of this policy
105 The question read: "Which of the following best describes department
policy regarding searches of premises contemporaneous with an arrest?" The
(Continued on next page)

1974]

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

has been dramatic-from 28% in 1967-68 to 85% currently. Indeed, in answering a follow-up question, 14 departments specifically cited Chimel as the reason behind their policy change
and another 24 cited court decisions generally without mentioning
a specific case. No non-judicial explanation for the change in
policy was given by any department.
The degree to which Chimel has affected automobile search
policies is less clear. The law of search and seizure has often
recognized the need for different procedures regarding automobiles. 10 Chimel dealt with a search of residential premises
and it can be argued that its holding does not extend to automobiles. Figure 9 shows a noticeable shift in police department
policies relating to automobile searches contemporaneous with
an arrest, but the shift is not as dramatic as that which occurred
in relation to searches of residential premises.
Twice as many
departments now restrict automobile searches according to the
constraints of Chimel and far fewer now allow officers to search
on a routine basis. Chimel was given as the reason for the policy
change by two departments and eight others attributed it to
unspecified judicial decisions. In the only response that gave a
non-judicial reason, the policy change was attributed to the installation of a new police chief.
In sum, if policy is taken as any measure of behavior, the
exclusionary rule operating through the contraints of the Chimel
decision has had a decided impact upon the nation's police.
D. Successful Motions to Suppress Evidence
or Dismissal of Charges
Another indicator, albeit an imperfect one, of the efficacy of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

alternatives were: "(1)

search is limited to area immediately under suspect's

control, (2) search can cover part or all of premises if officers suspect evidence or
contraband is located therein, (3) officers can search premises on a routine basis,
(4) other (explain), and (5) no clear policy is in effect." The next question read:
Was the above policy different five or six years ago? (Yes or no.) If yes, what
was the policy at that time?"
100 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).

107 The question read: "Which of the following best describes department
policy regarding searches of automobiles contemporaneous with an arrest?" The
alternatives were: "(1) search is limited to area immediately under suspect's control, (2) search can extend to trunk, glove compartment, etc., if officers have
reason to believe evidence or contraband are located there, (3) officers can search
entire automobile on a routine basis, (4) other (explain), and (5) no clear policy
is in effect." The next question read: "Was the above policy different five or six
years ago? (Yes or no.) If yes, what was the policy at that time?"
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the exclusionary rule is the degree to which motions to suppress

allegedly illegally seized evidence are granted. Presumably if no
such motions are granted, it is testimony to the rule's effectiveness
indicating that the police are not invading citizens' fourth amend-

ment rights. Of course in any jurisdiction some such motions will
be granted because good faith disagreements or uncertainties

about what the law requires will be resolved in the defendant's
favor. However, when motions to suppress are granted with considerable frequency, it can be taken as an indication that the
police are not making a good faith effort to abide by constitu-

tional limitations.
Nevertheless, counting successful motions is an imperfect
indicator for several reasons. One is that sometimes the police

or prosecutor, in anticipation of a successful motion, will drop
charges against a defendant early in the proceedings. Another

is that worthy motions may never be made because of defendants'
ignorance or out of strategy considerations. A third is that judges,
because of their ignorance of the law or lack of sympathy for the
exclusionary rule, will deny motions that should be granted. Any
of these phenomena will have the effect of reducing the number
of motions to suppress which are granted. The extent to which
they occur cannot be accurately measured, but they clearly do

take place in some degree. 10 8 Thus focusing on successful mo-

108 Oaks, supra note 20, at 688, notes considerable variety between cities in
prosecutorial screening of char ges against the probability of a successful motion to
suppress. Ban, supra note 36, found great hostility to the exclusionary rule among
Cincinnati and Boston judges. At least a few judges, however, are sympathetic.
See Younger, supra note 45. The author's questionnaire to public defenders posed
the following question: "How would you describe the attitude of the principal
judge(s) before whom you appear in regard to motions to suppress illegally seized
evidence?" Defenders in 24 cities responded; the answers were:
Very reluctant to grant such motions; will deny them unless an
overwhelming case can be made
10 (42%)
Sometimes willing to grant such motions if a plausible case can
be made
7 (29%)
Often willing to grant such motions if a plausible case can be
made
4 (17%)
Willingness to grant such motions depends upon the offense
involved or the seriousness of the charge
3 (12%)
The reluctance to make worthy motions is more speculative. However, it is probably declining as public defender and other programs give more defendants better
quality legal aid and appellate courts have become more concerned with the substance as well as the form of due process in criminal trials. Interviews with both
prosecutors and defenders indicated that the number of motions to suppress bad
increased considerably from the mid-1960's. Indeed many of them indicated that
such motions were made almost automatically regardless of their merit.
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tions to suppress will to some extent make the exclusionary rule
appear more efficacious than it actually is.
Despite these difficulties and the fact that they tend to weaken
their arguments, some opponents of the exclusionary rule have
focused on the granting of motions to suppress in making their
case that the exclusionary rule is ineffective. There is a hint of
this in Oaks' article and it seems to constitute the thrust of
Spiotto's argument.10 9 Spiotto recorded the frequency with which
such motions were made and granted in narcotics, gambling and
concealed weapons cases in Chicago's circuit courts for sample
periods in 1969 and 1971. While there is some variation by
offense, he found that 87% of the motions were granted in 1969
and 77% two years later. Even if one considers the fact that
only about 40% of those charged with these offenses made
motions to suppress, the number of defendants set free because
of illegal police searches amounted to about 35% in 1969 and 30%
in 1971. These are high percentages indeed and Spiotto strongly
implies that this is damning evidence that the exclusionary rule
does not deter police misconduct." 0 The implication, moreover,
has received some well placed publicity at the hands of the rule's
opponents."'
In Section II we argued that it was fallacious to draw general
conclusions from just one city. This is particularly true in this
situation. Judges in Chicago have long been noted for their
willingness to grant motions to suppress evidence. (Illinois
12
adopted the exclusionary rule many years prior to Mapp.)
Indeed, it is sometimes alleged that Chicago police habitually
conduct vice raids in a manner that ensures that a motion to
suppress will be successful."-' Beyond that, there is no prior
screening of cases by the states attorney's office in Chicago; every
charge, good, bad and indifferent, goes on the docket." 4 It
might be surmised that this combination of factors would not
109 Oaks, supra note 20, at 681-89; Spiotto, supra note 26.

13o Spiotto, supra note 26, at 245-48. See also Spiotto, supra note 53, at 37.
111 119 CONG. RiEc. S-2553 (daily ed. February 15, 1973).
112 People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924).
113 Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. L. REv. 493 (1952). See also LaFave, supra note 51, at
423.
114 Oaks, supra note 20, at 688.
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occur too often and that successful motions to suppress were
atypically high in Chicago.
In fact this is very much the case. In the questionnaires
sent to prosecutors and public defenders, the respondents were
asked to indicate (from fixed alternatives) the proportion of
motions to suppress which are granted in their jurisdiction." 5
Admittedly this is impressionistic data, but in the absence of
exact observation no one's impressions should be more reliable
than those who deal in such motions regularly. And there is no
good reason to think these impressions will be occupationally
biased. Indeed, we have asked the question of both prosecutors
and public defenders, and their answers in the aggregate average
at 10% and 12% respectively. 1 6 This is not to say that these
7
impressions constitute the hallmark of precision or reliability,1
but in the aggregate they can be taken as reasonably valid. Certainly they do not radically misrepresent reality.
Figure 10 shows the results for 65 cities. They stand in rather
stark contrast to those Spiotto reports for Chicago. In three-fifths
of the cities, motions to suppress evidence as illegally seized are
granted 10% of the time or less. Indeed, in some of these cities
the granting of such motions is a relatively rare event. At the
other extreme, in only 10% of the cities are such motions granted
as often as one-fourth of the time and only one city even approached Chicago's record. These responses certainly offer strong
evidence that Chicago is an exception-a gross exception-to the
national norm of granting suppression motions. Presumably
motions to suppress are granted somewhat more often nationally
1 5 For the prosecutor, the questions were: "In cases involving tangible evidence how common is it for the defendant to move for the suppression of evidence?" (The alternatives were: "virtually never done, occurs rather infrequently,
occurs somewhat frequently, occurs quite frequently.") It was followed by this
question: "How frequently are such motions granted?" (The alternatives are
shown in Figure 10.) Similar questions were asked of the public defender
respondents.
116 There is, however, a greater spread in the public defenders' estimates.
Over 90% of the prosecutors' answers fell between 2% and 25% while only about
65% of the defenders' impressions were within this range.
117

In 10 cities, answers were received from both prosecutors and public

defenders. In four both chose the same alternative (listed in Figure 10) and in
five others they chose adjacent alternatives. In only one city was there a sharp

difference in the estimates of the proportion of suppression motions granted.
Using this as a check on the accuracy of the respondents' impressions, we can see
that while they are crudely estimated, they are not "out of the ballpark."
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than they would be if the exclusionary rule approached perfection

as a deterrent to illegal police conduct, but our data offer no
support to an argument that the rule is largely or totally worth-

less as a device for controlling police conduct. 118
Figure 10

Proportion of Motions to Suppress Granted in 65 Cities*
Proportion
1% or Less

2-10%
11-25%
26-50%
Over 50%

Number of
Cities
7
32

%
11%
49%

20
5

31%
8%

1

2%

65

101%

*When differences in responses from the same city occurred, the Larger
estimate was used.

Motions to suppress are made at a somewhat advanced stage
in the process of evaluating the legality of the manner in which

evidence was seized. At least two prior stages exist, although
they lack the formality of a motion to suppress and they may
occur as much by indecision as by decision. Initially, of course, the

police themselves (once an arrest occurs) may drop the charge or
otherwise fail to prosecute it because, in their belief, the manner
in which the evidence was obtained precludes its admission and
thus no conviction is possible. If the police do not do this, the
prosecutor may take the same steps where in his judgment there
118 The time differential between Spiotto's observations and our questionnaire
appears inconsequential. We also asked our respondents for an estimate of the
proportion of suppression motions granted in 1967-68. Only three reported 50%
or more, and only seven answered in the 25% to 50% category. In the main, the
distribution was rather similar to that in Figure 10. Of 63 cities responding, 43
reported no change while 13 said that a higher proportion of motions were granted
in 1967-68 than are granted now and eight said the opposite. These data have
some bearing on our supposition that compliance with the exclusionary rule is
likely to be a developmental rather than a sudden phenomenon. If this is so, then
a greater proportion of suppression motions should have been granted in the
1967-68 period. This is the case, of course, but the difference is minimal. This
may be, in part, because more frivolous motions are made nowadays. See the discussion in note 102 supra. The minimal difference appears also to reflect a greater
willingness on the part of prosecutors who are perhaps opposed by more competent
or dedicated defense counsel these days to negotiate pleas in weak cases or ask
that charges be dismissed prior to the filing of such a motion.
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is little or no chance of conviction. In other words, just as we
looked at the third stage, so to speak, we can also use the first
and second stages as measures of the efficacy of the exclusionary
rule.
The police questionnaire asked the following: "In cases involving tangible evidence, does your department sometimes drop
charges against suspects because of the ruling excluding illegally
seized evidence at trials?" A very similar question was asked of
prosecutorial respondents. Unlike the granting of motions to
suppress, decisions or non-decisions at these early stages are not
very well given to numerical or percentage estimates; in the
former situation the respondent can grasp the total number of
motions and estimate the percentage of those successful while
for the latter situation the total number of cases where charges
could possibly be dropped is not so discrete or easily imaginable.
Consequently for the police and prosecutor's options of dropping
charges, closed answer adjectival estimates working their way
up from a base answer of "Never" were used rather than percentages based on the total number of cases possible.
Their responses are given in Figure 11. Some insights are
available from these data, although the data themselves, as well
as problems inherent in their collection, make definitive conclusions impossible. From the fact that only 12% of the police
departments drop charges more than occasionally and that nearly
two-thirds of them never or only rarely drop charges, we could
infer a high degree of police sensitivity to the exclusionary rule.
Undoubtedly there is a good deal of truth in such an inference.
But some respondents probably desire their department to appear
more law-abiding than it is and chose what was perhaps a
marginal alternative to describe the situation. Beyond that, some
departments may have a policy of never or seldom dropping
charges regardless of the likelihood of conviction. In other words,
while the police responses are comforting to proponents of the
exclusionary rule, their validity 19 is open to some question.
The prosecutors' responses are likely to be more valid. The
likelihood of conviction is more apt to be the controlling factor
in allowing a dismissal, because the prosecutor's reputation for
119 The term "validity" is used here in the scientific sense, i.e., the degree to
which the data you have actually measured the behavior you are interested in.
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Figure 11
Frequency With Which Charges Are Dropped Because
Evidence Has Been Illegally Seized
Frequency
Never
Rarely
Occasionally
Somewhat frequently
Very frequently

Police
Departments
18 (31%)
19 (32%)
15 (25%)
5 (9%)
2 (3%)
59 (100%)

Prosecutors
0
13 (30%)
21 (49%)
7 (16%)
2 (5%)
43 (100%)

compliance with the requirements of the law is not at stake."'
However, the implication of their responses for arguments about
the exclusionary rule's effectiveness is ambiguous. Only 30% are
such that a real police sensitivity to the rule can be inferred, while
about 20% are indicative of frequent police violation of citizens'
fourth amendment rights. The remainder in the "occasionally"
category are ambiguous in and of themselves.
In sum, the data in Figure 11 do not support an argument
that there is widespread police violation of the exclusionary rule's
mandate, but they do not furnish much ammunition for the
opposite contention either.
It is possible that Figures 10 and 11 hide widespread police
violations of the fourth amendment because they focus on the
behavior of each actor in the criminal justice process in isolation.
All you need to do to show that the exclusionary rule is not
deterring illegal police searches is to demonstrate that at one
point in the process large numbers of arrestees are being set free.
Presumably, if the police frequently dropped charges, prosecutors
would not have to dismiss them very often and judges would
not have much cause to grant motions to suppress. Or if the
prosecutors had a high rate of dismissal, it would not matter that
the police seldom dropped charges or that judges seldom granted
suppression motions. And, of course, if judges frequently granted
120 Because prosecutors are elected officials and often run for reelection on
their percentage of convictions there is some incentive to dismiss charges where
conviction is dubious. The police lack this political incentive. Moreover, to the
extent they are statistically judged, it is by cases closed rather than actual convictions.
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such motions, we might well expect it was because neither the
police nor the prosecutor were willing to drop charges.
Using the criteria of "somewhat frequently" or greater for
police and prosecutorial decisions to drop charges and an excess

of 25% of suppression motions granted, 12%, 21% and 10% of
the respondents respectively give answers indicative of widespread
police non-compliance with the fourth amendment. If these
categories of responses considered separately are hiding the
more frequent occurrence of such behavior, we might expect it
to take place in over 40% of the nation's cities.
We can check on this to some degree by analyzing the
responses from 18 cities which reported impressions on decisions
at all three stages in which the legality of a search is evaluated.
By the above criteria, only four (22%) of the cities reported
impressions at any stage indicative of police behavior largely
unaffected by the exclusionary rule. In two of the four cities,
impressions exceeding the above criteria were reported at two
stages. This suggests that in cities where the exclusionary rule
has not affected police behavior very much, this is manifested
at various points in the process by which the legality of a
search is evaluated. In the other 14 cities the responses from all
participants give no cause to believe that the police engage in
frequent or wholesale illegal searches. Perhaps these 18 cities are
not representative enough to settle the matter conclusively, but
insofar as we can tell, Figures 10 and 11 do not camouflage widespread police violations of the fourth amendment.
IV
For those seeking conclusive evidence about the efficacy of
the exclusionary rule, the findings reported above are probably
disappointing. Different measures point in varied and sometimes
slightly contradictory directions and some of the results are
subject to ambiguous interpretation. Taken as a whole, the main
emphasis to be put on the findings is a negative one: they cast
considerable doubt on earlier conclusions that the rule is ineffective in deterring illegal police searches. To be sure, such an
assertion may have been appropriate at one time, and as some
of our evidence suggests, there are still circumstances in which
the rule has a minimal impact on police behavior. But these
circumstances are comparatively few. Most of our data do not
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permit such an inference. Indeed, a good many of the findings
support a positive inference-that the rule goes far toward fulfilling its purpose. Beyond this, the incomplete nature of the data
and the ambiguity of its interpretation serve to aid arguments on
behalf of the rule's effectiveness because in this situation at least
it is easier to demonstrate the existence of widespread non-compliance with the fourth amendment than it is to demonstrate
compliance. It is usually necessary to support assertions of compliance by inference rather than direct evidence; and such inferences are always subject to a counter-argument that one is not
using the right measure or looking in the right places. Nonetheless, the inconclusiveness of our findings is real enough; they do
not nail down an argument that the exclusionary rule has accomplished its task.
At this stage it is not that important that the results point
unreservedly in one direction or another. Rather, it is more
important that we have some data on the matter. As was noted
at the beginning of this article, the exclusionary rule is undergoing a crisis. On the basis of some cursory and perhaps symptomatic diagnosis, it has nearly been pronounced dead. In the not
too distant future our courts and legislative bodies will have to
decide whether they want to accept this diagnosis and issue the
death certificate. Hopefully in this situation, as should be the
case in all important questions of public policy, such a decision
will be based on as large a quantity of reliable and valid information as can reasonably be obtained. This is particularly the case
where constitutional policies are involved. By definition as well
as by tradition, such policies should be stable. Stability should
not be equated with inflexibility. But stability does mean that
constitutional policies should be more than mere reflections of
prevailing ideological winds, and it suggests that the consideration
which goes into the promulgation of these policies extends beyond
casual or emotional reaction to particular events or short-term
political pressures.
Inevitably the evidence must be weighed in the balance; but
evaluation will involve more than seeing which side of the scale
is lower. The evidence must be put in perspective. As was
pointed out in Section II, the impact of major changes in public
policy on day-to-day behavior is usually not very far-reaching
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immediately after adoption of any new rule. Only after a substantial amount of time has passed do trends of changing behavior
(if any) become apparent. Then and only then do the scale
readings have real meaning.
The most obvious example of the necessity of such a perspective is the 1954 desegregation decision. 2 ' Anyone who looked
at desegregation data for 1955 or 1956 or even for a good many
subsequent years would have concluded that the policy was a
failure, a virtual dead letter, openly defied by those to whom it
was directed. And so it was at that time. Would it then have
been appropriate to argue that even though laudable in intention,
the decision should be overruled because it was not having the
desired impact and was attended by many severe disadvantages
such as increased racial tension, civil disorders, and repeal of
compulsory education laws to name but a few. The answer of
course is no. An opposite answer would have been indicative of
an utter absence of any understanding of the importance of time
in the changing of public policy. From the comparatively distant
perspective of two decades later, desegregation has worked
reasonably well. There is widespread integration in southern
schools (to say nothing of other institutions) and the disadvantageous costs have diminished significantly. Desegregation,
while a dramatic illustration, is hardly the only example. Despite
initial disinterest or resistance, fundamental changes in constitutional policies such as those defining obscenity, providing
counsel for indigent defendants and reforming juvenile court
procedures have been successfully implemented.
Indeed, it can be argued that the exclusionary rule has a
particularly strong claim on a perspective encompassing a tolerant
time frame. After all, the substantive law of search and seizure
has been in a state of high confusion in the United States in
recent years. The Supreme Court does not seem to know its
own mind in charting the principles governing the legality of
searches; 122 a scholarly justice calls for an "overhauling" of the
121 Brovn v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122 Compare Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), with Cooper v.

California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); compare Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949), with One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
and compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), with Chimel v.
California 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

KENTUcKY LAW JOUBNAL

[Vol. 62

law here; 123 leading commentators describe it by the term "quagmire" or other uncomplimentary adjectives; 124 state appellate
courts divide sharply over the meaning and thrust of United States
Supreme Court decisions. 25 It is little wonder that even now
patrolmen, detectives, prosecutors and trial judges exhibit varied
behavior in similar search-and-seizure situations. We can hope
that "the course of true law" may soon be found, but we must
show some tolerance of the behavior of those for whom it "has
126
not run smooth."

But a broad perspective encompasses more than a willingness
to evaluate the rule's impact over time. It seems quite appropriate
to consider the exclusionary rule as an integral part of a larger
concept of the makeup of due process of law in criminal cases.
Mapp, it should be rememebered, was but one of many decisions
of the Warren Court during the 1960's which virtually revolutionized procedural requirements in this area. Cases such as
Gideon v. Wainwright,127 Escobedo v. Illinois,128 Miranda v. Ari-

zona, 2 9 In re Gault'

and a host of less well known decisions

now require behavior in law enforcement agencies heretofore

alien to the system's participants. This means that the pressure
on these agencies to accommodate their operations to new policies
exists not only in the area of search and seizure but in virtually
every phase of their operations. Of course an evaluation of the
exclusionary rule must rest primarily on its own peculiar impact

on police behavior, but the meaning of this impact must be
considered in the broader context of the Warren Court's vast
restructuring of criminal justice procedures. If this restructuring
succeeds generally, it is likely to enhance the exclusionary rule's
probabilities of success.
123 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
124 LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures
into the "Quagmire," 8 Crm. L. BtUL. 9 (1972); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A
No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474 (1961).
125 Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil
Liberties Decision, 8 LAw & Soc. REv. 109 (1973).
126 LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . .Has not...
Run Smooth," 1966 ILL. L.F. 255. The quotation is from Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
127 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
128 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
129 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
130387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Despite the "law and order" backlash, it appears that the
Warren Court has promulgated an idea-a concept of due
process of law-whose time has come. It is more than a matter
of command, although command is important. It is also a
matter of preaching and inspiration, of calling to our attention
in a new context the best ideas of our legal and cultural heritage.
The Warren Court's actions here have embodied the twin ideas
of the irreduceable dignity of the individual and the rule of law.
The law protects the least of us as much as the greatest, and the
guardians of the law are as much bound by its precepts as are
those who are guarded. In Herbert Packer's terms,' 31 the Supreme
Court has advanced the Due Process Model as a viable alternative
to the Crime Control Model which had heretofore prevailed in
the lower echelons of the criminal process. Much of the public,
and what is more important, many participants in the law enforcement system, have come to accept the principles underlying the
Court's new policies not only because they are legally authoritative but because they seem appropriate and just. Acceptance is
slow and anything but smooth, with "old school" personnel continning to adhere to the Crime Control philosophy. But it is
nevertheless occurring. The recent emphasis on education and
professionalism in police departments, prosecutors' offices and
magistrates' courts bring new attitudes to the fore; the "old
school" is a diminishing breed. This does not mean that every
aspect of the Due Process Model will be accepted uncritically
or that all of the Warren Court's policies will stand undisturbed.
But fundamentally it seems too late to turn back the clock.
These perspectives are not offered to suggest that the successful implementation of the exclusionary rule should be taken as
inevitable. Some policies embody ideas whose time never does
come and they fail-and this can be true even of those encompassed in a generally successful wave of reform. Rather the perspectives are offered to suggest that the exclusionary rule is in
considerably better health than some of its "attendant physicians"
would have us believe. 132 While not without some serious probPacker, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
evidence warrants a conclusion that the exclusionary rule is inefficacious, he certainly would not foreclose
consideration on their own merits of suggested alternatives to or modifications of
the rule.
13'

132 Whe the author does not believe the em ia
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lems, so far as our data and perspectives suffice, the rule is
maintaining its vital signs. Obviously further tests should be
made. But in the meantime, perhaps the most acute problem
facing the exclusionary rule is how to prevent the earlier diagnosis
of a terminal illness from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

